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less, such considerations did not operate to dissolve the court's power to hear
the case at bar.
The Court also rejected the
Government's contention that, because
funds deposited in the United States
Treasury may be released only by a
congressional appropriation under Art.
I, § 9, Cl. 7 of the United States Constitution, any judgment handed down
would necessarily be "useless" within
the meaning of the exception to appellate jurisdiction discussed above. Id. at
560. The Court reasoned that in 31
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) Congress has provided for the refund of funds that are
erroneously received. Id. In addition,
28 U.S.C. § 2465 states that property
seized under any act of Congress shall
be returned following the disposition of
judgment in the defendant's favor.
Under the Court's interpretation ofthese
statutes, a formal appropriation would
not be required under these circumstances. Id. at 561. Because the funds
would be returned to their rightful owner
following a favorable judgment, the
Court concluded that a decision in the
bank's favor would thus be enforceable. Id.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring
opinion, stated that he would have applied § 1521 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, 106
Stat. 3672, which amended 28 V.S.c. §
1355. Section 1521, which the President signed on October 28, 1992, provides that the removal of property by a
prevailing party in a civil forfeiture
action does not deprive the appellate
court ofjurisdiction in the matter. The
majority expressly declined to interpret
the statute or to determine its retroactive effect. Republic National Bank of
Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 560 n.5. Justice
Thomas, however, believed the Court
should have applied the principle recognized in United States v. Alabama,
362 U.S. 602 (1960), that new laws
which enlarge jurisdiction apply to cases
currently pending before a court.
Republic National Bank of Miami
v. United States represents a refusal by
the Court to curtail the right of property
22 - V. Bait. L.F.l23.3

owners to appeal an adverse decision in
civil forfeiture proceedings brought by
the Government. In declining to interpret the retroactive effect of § 1521 of
the Housing and Conununity Development Act of 1992, the Court indicated
that, even absent such a statute, it would
not pernlit tl1e Government to escape a
full adjudication of a civil forfeiture
claim on technical procedural grounds.
Based on this decision, owners of property seized by the Government pursuant
to 21 V.S.C. § 881(a)(6) will beguaran teed the right to appeal a district
court ruling forfeiting title to their property to the United States.

-Scott N Alperin

Crosby v. United States: CRIMINAL TRIAL MAY NOT PROCEED
IF DEFENDANT IS NOT
PRESENT AT COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL.
In Crosby v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 748 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 43 prohibits a trial
in absentia of a defendant who is not
present at the commencement of trial.
In arriving at this holding, the Court
examined the express language, the history, and the logic of the Rule.
Michael Crosby and others were
indicted on several counts of mail fraud
by a federal grandjury in the District of
Minnesota. He and his codefendants
were accused of devising a scheme to
fraudulently sell military-veteran commemorative medallions. Crosby appeared before a federal magistrate and
pleaded not guilty. He was conditionally released from detention upon agreeing to post a bond and remain in the
state. He attended pretrial conferences
and hearings with his attorney and was
advised of the trial date.
Crosby, however, did not appear for
his trial in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.
Deputy marshals attempted to locate
him but were unsuccessful. The court
expressed concern over the delay because the pool of potential jurors was
waiting and the delay could have interfered with the court's calendar. The
prosecutor noted that Crosby's attorney and codefendants were present and
that it would be difficult for her to
reschedule the case due to the age and
health problems of some of the witnesses.
The district court suggested that the
trial begin despite Crosby's absence,
and Crosby's attorney objected. TIle
Governnlent fOfl1lally requested that the
trial conunence because Crosby was
still not located after several days of
search, and Crosby's bond was forfeited.
The court stated for the record its
findings that Crosby had adequate no-

tice of the trial and that his absence was and witnesses testifying against the de- terpretation that prohibits the trial in
knowing and deliberate. It fu rther stated fendant met face-to-face with the defen- absentia of a defendant who is not
that trying Crosby separately from his dant, the Court explained that this right present at the conunencement of trial.
codefendants would present problems to be present could not be waived. ld. This holding makes it clear that if the
The Court next examined the com- defendant is present at the commencefor the Government, witnesses, counsel, and court. The court concl uded that mon law as it was applied in Diaz v. ment of the trial and later is absent, his
Crosby had voluntarily waived his con- United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). In absence is considered knowing and destitutional right to be present during the that case, the Court held that the liberate. Under these circumstances,
trial and that the public interest in pro- defendant's voluntary absence after the his constitutional right to be present
ceeding with trial in his absence out- trial had begun did not nullify what had during his trial is considered waived.
weighed his interest in being present at been done and did not prevent the This assures that the Government, witthe proceedings. The jury found Crosby completion of the trial. Crosby, 113 S. nesses, counsel, and court will not be
guilty, and months later Crosby was Ct. at 752 (citing Diaz, 223 U.S. at kept waiting and that the defendant's
455). Instead, the defendant's absence right to a speedy trial is not abridged. In
found, arrested, and sentenced.
The United States Court of Appeals operated as a waiver of his right to be so holding, the Supreme Court clarified
for the Eighth Circuit upheld the con- present and left the Court free to pro- an arguably ambiguous rule oflaw.
victions. The United States Supreme ceed with the trial as ifhe were present.
In Diaz, however, the Supreme Court
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Court granted certiorari.
Rule 43 provides in pertinent part did not address the situation in which a
that "[t]he defendant shall be present. defendant fails to appear for the com.. at every stage of the trial ... except mencement of the trial. Crosby, 113 S.
as otherwise prOVided by this rule." Ct. at 752.
The Supreme Court established imCrosby, 113 S. Ct. at 751 (quoting Fed.
R. Crim. P. 43(a))(emphasis added). portant differences between flight beThe Rule further states that the defen- fore trial and flight during trial, and the
dant is considered to have waived the Court emphasized several practical conright to be present if he is initially siderations that supported its conclupresent and then voluntarily absent af- sion. To begin with, the costs of suster the trial has conunenced. Crosby, pending a proceeding already under way
113 S. Ct. at 751 (citing Fed. R. Crim. would be greater than the costs of postP. 43(b)).
poning a trial which has not yet begun.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court Because of this, the Court deemed the
examined the plain language ofthe Rule. conunencement oftrial a plausible place
The Court noted that the Rule contains to make the distinction. ld. In addition,
a comprehensive listing of the circum- Rule43 treats mid-trial flight as a knowstances under which the right to be ing and voluntary waiver of the right to
present may be waived. Crosby, 113 S. be present. The initial presence of the
Ct. at 751. The Rule's use of the limit- defendant, asserted the Court, assures
ing phrase "except as otherwise pro- that any subsequent waiver is volunvided" indicates that the list of situa- tary. Id. Furthermore, the Rule detions in which the trial may proceed prives the defendant of the option of
without the defendant is not exhaustive. terminating the trial if it seems that the
ld. In that respect, the Court found the verdict will go against him. Otherwise,
the Cou rt stated, a defendant may choose
language to be unambiguous. ld.
The Court also looked to the law as to abscond during the trial so that it
it existed at the time the Rule was would be terminated. ld. at 752-53 .
. adopted. The general rule at conm10n For that reason, a trial must be allowed
law was that the personal presence of to continue if the defendant is present at
the defendant was essential to a valid the beginning of the trial and later flees.
trial and conviction on a felony charge,
In Crosby v. United States, the Suand a conviction was required to be set preme Court clarified the scope of Fedaside if the defendant was absent. ld. eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.
Recognizing that the notion that a fair The language, history, and logic of the
trial could only take place if the jurors Rule all support a straightforward in23.3/U. BaIt. L.F. - 23

